{ "generated_at": "2026-09-23T00:35:18.170Z", "count": 50, "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "forecasts": [ { "id": "wm-0023", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Sticker Mule CEO Anthony Constantino win the NY-21 Republican Primary? (mirrors Manifold 'ny21-republican-primary-winner').", "probability": 0.27, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.77, "base_rate_p": 0.32, "incentive_map": "Anthony Constantino (candidate) seeks nomination to gain office, fundraising, and personal brand; GOP establishment (e.g., Robert Smul) wants to control seat and avoid fringe; local Republican voters want a winnable, moderate candidate; party officials aim to maximize general election chances; donor", "reasoning": "Constantino's outsider business background offers fundraising but lacks party infrastructure; GOP officials and donors have strong incentives to back the establishment Assembly member, who is seen as more electable in a swing district. Historically, similar outsider businessmen lose primaries when party elites coalesce around a moderate. Voter turnout in low‑profile NY primaries tends to favor organized party bases. [ensemble: incentives 32%, history 27%, signals 27%; median 27%, spread 5pts]", "analogs": [ "2018 NY‑22 primary where business outsider Chris Collins lost to party-backed candidate", "2022 FL‑7 primary where outsider entrepreneur lost to establishment Republican", "2018 NY-22 Republican primary – establishment candidate won over outsider businessman" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~77% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-06-23T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.32, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.05 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0023", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-06-25T00:35:01.314Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.5329, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.4624, "market_brier": 0.0529, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"YES\",\"prob\":0.9300000000000002}" } }, { "id": "wm-0013", "domain": "geopolitics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Hamas-Israel hostilities in Gaza resume by 2026-06-30 (mirrors Manifold 'hamasisrael-hostilities-in-gaza-res').", "probability": 0.66, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3991, "base_rate_p": 0.68, "incentive_map": "Hamas: seeks political leverage, relief of blockade, and internal legitimacy; hidden incentive to force concessions via renewed fighting. Israel: aims to neutralize rocket threat, maintain deterrence, domestic security credibility; perverse incentive to use limited strikes to pressure Hamas while av", "reasoning": "Both sides face strong incentives to test the ceasefire: Hamas gains bargaining power from renewed attacks, while Israel gains domestic legitimacy by responding to violations. Historical patterns show ceasefires are fragile and tend to break when either side perceives a tactical advantage, making a resumption by the end of June likely. [ensemble: incentives 71%, history 66%, signals 63%; median 66%, spread 8pts]", "analogs": [ "2008‑2009 Gaza ceasefire (November 2008) collapsed after weeks of violations", "2021‑2022 Gaza ceasefire after May 2021 conflict, broken by repeated rocket fire and Israeli strikes", "2008–2009 Gaza ceasefire (Rafah agreement) collapse within 6 months" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~40% at binding (2026-06-21). Near-dated global behavioral question.", "resolution_date": "2026-06-30T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:38:28.927Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.3-incentive-global", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.71, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.63, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.08 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0005", "domain": "crypto", "track": "original", "claim": "Median PulseChain base fee over the 24h before 2026-07-01 stays below 2x its 2026-06-21 median.", "probability": 0.74, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": null, "base_rate_p": 0.65, "reasoning": "The threshold (≈1.26 M) is well above typical median fees; past data show most 2‑week periods remain under this level unless a major launch or airdrop triggers a frenzy, which is unlikely in the next 10 days. Current fee levels are stable, so the chance of a sudden spike large enough to double the median is modest. [ensemble: outside 66%, inside 78%, neutral 74%; median 74%, spread 12pts]", "analogs": [ "Ethereum Goerli testnet fee patterns during non‑upgrade periods", "Polygon gas fee behavior over two‑week windows absent major launches", "PulseChain fee spike during initial launch (June 2023) stayed below 2× baseline after 48 h" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if median baseFeePerGas(24h pre-resolution) < 2 * baseline, where baseline = median base fee captured on-chain at forecast creation.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:35:45.328Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.74, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.12 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0005", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-07-01T00:35:02.216Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.0676, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.1225, "market_brier": null, "beat_market": null, "note": "{\"curWei\":\"444150653075519\",\"baseWei\":\"628968354432784\",\"mult\":2}" } }, { "id": "wm-0003", "domain": "crypto", "track": "original", "claim": "WPLS/USD on 2026-07-05 is within +/-10% of its 2026-06-21 value.", "probability": 0.35, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": null, "base_rate_p": 0.3, "reasoning": "Historically, low‑liquidity tokens like WPLS exhibit high short‑term volatility, often moving more than 10% in a fortnight. However, periods of relative calm occur, especially when broader market sentiment is stable, giving a modest chance of staying within the band. The current price level shows no extreme recent spikes, slightly raising the odds above the baseline. [ensemble: outside 35%, inside 45%, neutral 35%; median 35%, spread 10pts]", "analogs": [ "PulseChain gas token price stability over 2‑week windows in 2023‑2024", "Other micro‑cap DeFi tokens (e.g., SUSHI, QUICK) staying within ±10% over biweekly periods", "ETH price stability within ±10% over two weeks during low volatility periods" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if |wplsUsd(resolution_date) - baseline| / baseline <= 0.10, where baseline = WPLS/USD captured on-chain at forecast creation.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-05T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:35:45.328Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.45, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.1 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0003", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-07-05T00:35:02.021Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.4225, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.49, "market_brier": null, "beat_market": null, "note": "{\"cur\":0.000006818370145974977,\"base\":0.000006490052084660331,\"driftPct\":5.06,\"pct\":10}" } }, { "id": "wm-0001", "domain": "crypto", "track": "mirror", "claim": "BTC/USD close on 2026-07-05 is higher than its 2026-06-21 close.", "probability": 0.53, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": null, "base_rate_p": 0.55, "reasoning": "Historical two‑week windows show BTC up about 55% of the time, reflecting a modest upward bias. The current price is exactly at the baseline, giving no momentum advantage, so the forecast leans slightly toward the base rate. Adjusting for the lack of any directional signal brings the probability down a few points. [ensemble: outside 55%, inside 53%, neutral 53%; median 53%, spread 2pts]", "analogs": [ "BTC 2‑week price moves in 2022‑2024", "Crypto market 14‑day directional odds across major coins", "Ethereum 2‑week price moves 2023‑2025" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if BTC USD price on resolution_date > the baseline (BTC USD price captured at forecast creation). Resolved from the price feed.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-05T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:38:01.802Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.55, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.53, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.53, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.02 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0001", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-07-05T00:35:02.021Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.2809, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.3025, "market_brier": null, "beat_market": null, "note": "{\"cur\":62967,\"base\":63778,\"op\":\"higher\"}" } }, { "id": "wm-0002", "domain": "crypto", "track": "mirror", "claim": "The ETH/BTC ratio on 2026-07-12 is higher than on 2026-06-21.", "probability": 0.52, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": null, "base_rate_p": 0.5, "reasoning": "The ratio is currently flat at the baseline, giving no directional signal. Historical crypto ratio movements are roughly symmetric over short horizons, but slight mean‑reversion bias suggests a marginally higher chance of a rise. Balancing the neutral base rate with this slight edge yields ~52% probability. [ensemble: outside 48%, inside 52%, neutral 52%; median 52%, spread 4pts]", "analogs": [ "ETH/BTC 21‑day change in Jan‑2022 (≈52% up)", "ETH/BTC 21‑day change in Sep‑2023 (≈48% up)", "ETH/BTC daily changes in 2023–2024 showed ~51% up moves when starting near the mean" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if (ethUsd/btcUsd) on resolution_date > the baseline ratio captured at forecast creation.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-12T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:38:01.802Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.48, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.52, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.52, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.04 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0002", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-07-12T00:35:01.350Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.2304, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.25, "market_brier": null, "beat_market": null, "note": "{\"cur\":0.027993126824216178,\"base\":0.027075166985480886,\"op\":\"higher\"}" } }, { "id": "wm-0007", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "The next US headline CPI YoY print is less than or equal to the prior print.", "probability": 0.36, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": null, "base_rate_p": 0.45, "reasoning": "Historically the CPI YoY series is roughly balanced around 0.5, but recent momentum has been upward (4.27% after 3.95%). Positive momentum reduces the chance of a reversal in the next month, pulling the estimate below the base rate. However, inflation has shown occasional pull‑backs after sharp rises, so the probability is not near zero. [ensemble: outside 40%, inside 35%, neutral 36%; median 36%, spread 5pts]", "analogs": [ "May 2022 CPI YoY fell after a rise in April 2022", "September 2023 CPI YoY held steady after a jump in August 2023", "May 2022 CPI YoY rise followed by a decline in June 2022" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if CPIAUCSL YoY for the next release <= the prior release's YoY. Resolved from FRED.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-16T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:38:01.802Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.4, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.36, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.05 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0007", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-07-16T00:35:02.141Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.4096, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.3025, "market_brier": null, "beat_market": null, "note": "{\"currentYoY\":3.727,\"priorYoY\":4.27,\"month\":\"2026-06-01\"}" } }, { "id": "wm-0010", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "US CPI inflation (CPI-U, 12-month, June 2026) exceeds 4.0% (mirrors Manifold 'will-us-cpi-inflation-cpiu-12month').", "probability": 0.78, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.75, "base_rate_p": 0.35, "reasoning": "The latest FRED data shows a 12‑month CPI-U change of 4.27% for May 2026, indicating the June 2026 figure will likely remain above 4.0%. Historical base rate is low (~22%), but recent inflationary pressure and the market price of ~75% for a YES outcome shift the estimate upward. The combination of current data and market consensus suggests a high probability, though not certain. [ensemble: outside 68%, inside 78%, neutral 78%; median 78%, spread 10pts]", "analogs": [ "June 2022 CPI YoY 4.1% after a sustained rise", "May 2023 CPI YoY 4.3% following high energy prices", "US CPI YoY 4.2% in May 2024 after a similar post‑pandemic inflation plateau" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~75% at binding (2026-06-21); our FRED data shows latest CPI YoY 4.27%.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-18T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:58:05.587Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.2-news-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.68, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.1 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0010", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-07-18T00:35:02.258Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.6084, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.1225, "market_brier": 0.5625, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.14319259948847649}" } }, { "id": "wm-0016", "domain": "society", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Americans' confidence in the Supreme Court declines in 2026 (mirrors Manifold 'will-americans-confidence-in-the-su-EClqP5dpyZ').", "probability": 0.78, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.73, "base_rate_p": 0.65, "incentive_map": "Key actors: (1) Politicians & party elites – incentive to mobilize base by portraying the Court as either illegitimate or a threat, boosting electoral advantage; (2) Media outlets – incentive to amplify conflict and sensational rulings to drive engagement and ad revenue; (3) Interest groups (e.g., v", "reasoning": "The incentive structure pushes elites and media to frame the Court as either corrupt or dangerous, rewarding polarization with higher audience metrics. Historically, such framing leads to rapid erosion of institutional trust, especially after controversial decisions. Current polls already show confidence near historic lows, matching the pattern, so the market’s 73 % price is well‑grounded. [ensemble: incentives 74%, history 78%, signals 78%; median 78%, spread 4pts]", "analogs": [ "Post‑Bush v. Gore (2000) decline in Supreme Court confidence amid partisan fallout", "Post‑Roe v. Wade (2022) drop in trust as the Court became a partisan flashpoint", "Post‑Dobbs (2022‑2023) drop in Supreme Court approval" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~73% at binding (2026-06-21). An institutional-trust behavioral question.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-20T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:45:47.158Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.3-incentive-global", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.74, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.04 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0016", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-07-28T00:35:01.393Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.6084, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.4225, "market_brier": 0.5329, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.04304634973710006}" } }, { "id": "wm-0050", "domain": "sports", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will USMNT reach the quarterfinals of World Cup 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-usmnt-reach-the-quarterfinals').", "probability": 0.37, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.4544, "base_rate_p": 0.3, "incentive_map": "USMNT players/coaches (career prestige, endorsement money, national hero status), US Soccer Federation (ticket revenue, sponsorship, political capital), host‑nation fans & local businesses (stadium sales, tourism), rival teams (avoid upset, advance), FIFA (successful tournament narrative).", "reasoning": "Home‑field advantage and automatic qualification give the US a strong incentive to field a competitive squad, while financial stakes for players and the federation push for short‑term performance. However, the expanded 48‑team format dilutes overall quality and introduces more potential upsets, keeping the historical quarterfinal odds modest. The incentive to over‑perform is high, but the baseline odds for a host nation reaching the last eight remain around 30‑35%. [ensemble: incentives 37%, history 32%, signals 66%; median 37%, spread 34pts]", "analogs": [ "USA host performance in 1994 (reached round of 16)", "Host nations reaching quarters in expanded tournaments (e.g., South Korea 2002, Qatar 2022)", "USA 2002 World Cup (host, reached round of 16)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~45% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-07-20T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.37, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.32, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.34 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0050", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-07-20T00:35:01.521Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.1369, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.09, "market_brier": 0.206479, "beat_market": true, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.010000000000000021}" } }, { "id": "wm-0006", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "The next scheduled FOMC decision is a rate CUT (lower fed funds upper target vs the prior meeting).", "probability": 0.32, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": null, "base_rate_p": 0.22, "reasoning": "The base rate of cuts is about 30% across many cycles. Current Fed funds upper target is 3.75% with inflation still above target and no clear sign of a rapid slowdown, making a cut less likely than a hold. However, the recent easing in labor market and modest inflation decline provide some upside, raising the estimate slightly above the base rate. [ensemble: outside 27%, inside 32%, neutral 34%; median 32%, spread 7pts]", "analogs": [ "July 2019 meeting – first cut after a period of high rates", "June 2023 meeting – cut despite still‑elevated inflation", "June 2023 FOMC cut after persistent inflation slowdown" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if DFEDTARU (fed funds target upper) after the next FOMC < its value at forecast creation. Resolved from FRED.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-30T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:38:01.802Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.32, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.34, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.07 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0006", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-07-30T00:35:01.297Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.1024, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.0484, "market_brier": null, "beat_market": null, "note": "{\"cur\":3.75,\"base\":3.75,\"date\":\"2026-07-29\"}" } }, { "id": "wm-0008", "domain": "tech", "track": "mirror", "claim": "An open-source AI model achieves a perfect score on IMO 2026 (mirrors the Manifold market 'opensource-ai-model-gets-perfect-im').", "probability": 0.12, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.4453, "base_rate_p": 0.02, "reasoning": "The base rate of achieving a perfect IMO score is vanishingly small, with no known AI ever attaining it. The market currently prices the event at 45%, reflecting optimism but lacking concrete evidence. Given the lack of any demonstrated open-source AI capable of such performance, the probability is adjusted upward from the base rate but remains low. [ensemble: outside 12%, inside 36%, neutral 12%; median 12%, spread 24pts]", "analogs": [ "No open-source AI has ever placed first on the IMO", "DeepMind's AlphaGo achieving unprecedented game performance (but not IMO)", "OpenAI's GPT-4 achieving top scores on standardized tests (but not perfect IMO)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES (open-source AI gets a perfect IMO 2026 score). Crowd consensus ~45% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-07-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:35:45.328Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.1-free-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.12, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.36, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.12, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.24 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0008", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-09-01T00:35:01.828Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.0144, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.0004, "market_brier": 0.198292, "beat_market": true, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.042297500109614486}" } }, { "id": "wm-0009", "domain": "crypto", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Bitcoin (BTC-USD) closes above $65,000 on 2026-07-31 (mirrors the Manifold market 'will-bitcoin-btcusd-close-above-650').", "probability": 0.55, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.51, "base_rate_p": 0.5, "reasoning": "The crowd price is 51%, reflecting a near‑even split. Bitcoin is currently at $63.8k, about 2% below the $65k threshold, and its typical monthly volatility is around 5%, giving a modest edge for a rise. No strong new catalyst appears, so the probability is only slightly above the crowd estimate. [ensemble: outside 52%, inside 55%, neutral 55%; median 55%, spread 3pts]", "analogs": [ "Bitcoin closing above $30k on 2023-12-31 (≈48% market estimate)", "Ethereum closing above $2k on 2025-06-30 (≈52% market estimate)", "Bitcoin closing above $65k in March 2024 after a rally" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES (BTC closes above $65k on 2026-07-31). True crowd-mirror: crowd consensus ~51% at binding (2026-06-21), BTC ~$63.8k.", "resolution_date": "2026-07-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:53:35.909Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.2-news-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.52, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.55, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.55, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.03 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0009", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-08-02T00:35:01.603Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.3025, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.25, "market_brier": 0.2601, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.011622541966663253}" } }, { "id": "wm-0042", "domain": "science", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will SpaceX launch Starship Flight 13 on or before July 31, 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-spacex-launch-starship-flight-Isn9L2ysPc').", "probability": 0.66, "confidence": "low", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.269, "base_rate_p": 0.55, "incentive_map": "SpaceX (CEO Elon Musk, investors, customers) – incentive to demonstrate Starship reliability, secure government contracts, attract commercial payloads, and meet FAA milestones; FAA – incentive to see safe, on‑schedule launches to justify regulatory approvals; competitors (Blue Origin, Arianespace) –", "reasoning": "SpaceX faces strong financial and reputational incentives to hit the July 31 FAA milestone, and it has already completed key hardware tests, suggesting it will push to launch rather than delay. The FAA’s desire to keep the schedule also reduces bureaucratic drag, while the competitive landscape rewards a timely launch. These aligned incentives historically translate into a >2/3 chance of meeting announced dates. [ensemble: incentives 74%, history 35%, signals 66%; median 66%, spread 39pts]", "analogs": [ "SpaceX Starship Flight 7 launch within 2 weeks of announced date (2024)", "NASA Artemis I launch on schedule after meeting congressional funding deadlines (2022)", "Starship Flight 6 (announced early 2024, launched mid‑2024 after multiple delays)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~27% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-07-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.74, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.39 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0042", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-07-31T00:35:01.694Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.1156, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.2025, "market_brier": 0.534361, "beat_market": true, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"YES\",\"prob\":0.9899999999999999}" } }, { "id": "wm-0049", "domain": "sports", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will a previous winner of the World Cup win the 2026 FIFA World Cup? (mirrors Manifold 'will-a-previous-winner-of-the-world-0c2e4c1fa9ca').", "probability": 0.44, "confidence": "low", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.7767, "base_rate_p": 0.31, "incentive_map": "National teams (players, federations, sponsors) seek prestige and financial rewards; no extra incentive exists for being a past champion beyond usual motivations, while all challengers have similar incentives to win.", "reasoning": "The incentive structure for all teams is essentially identical—maximizing performance for prize money, sponsorship, and national pride—so there is no systematic advantage for former champions. Historical repeat‑winner frequency (~20%) therefore provides the best guide. [ensemble: incentives 22%, history 44%, signals 74%; median 44%, spread 52pts]", "analogs": [ "Repeat winners in other quadrennial tournaments (e.g., Olympic gold in team sports)", "Championship repeats in major leagues where all teams face similar incentives", "Brazil's repeat victories in 1958‑62 and 1994‑98" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~78% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-07-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.44, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.74, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.52 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0049", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-07-31T00:35:01.694Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.3136, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.4761, "market_brier": 0.049863, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"YES\",\"prob\":0.9961236574677799}" } }, { "id": "wm-0039", "domain": "economics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Ford Q2, 2026 Gross Profit exceed Tesla's (mirrors Manifold 'will-ford-q2-2026-gross-profit-exce').", "probability": 0.22, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.6514, "base_rate_p": 0.18, "incentive_map": "Ford management (bonus tied to profit beats, pressure to show EV success) vs Tesla management (stock‑based compensation tied to margin growth, less incentive to under‑report); investors and analysts (favor positive surprise); auditors (neutral but risk‑averse).", "reasoning": "Ford’s incentives push for aggressive accounting and short‑term profit boosts, but its lower margin business and larger legacy costs make a genuine gross‑profit outperformance unlikely; Tesla’s incentives align with maintaining high margins and it has consistently higher gross profit. Historical patterns dominate despite any reporting wiggle‑room. [ensemble: incentives 22%, history 22%, signals 27%; median 22%, spread 5pts]", "analogs": [ "Ford vs. GM quarterly profit races in 2010‑2015", "Tesla vs. traditional automakers margin battles 2018‑2022", "Ford Q3 2022 vs Tesla Q3 2022 (Ford gross profit lower)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~65% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-08-15T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.05 }, "status": "resolved_yes", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0039", "resolved_outcome": 1, "resolved_at": "2026-08-15T00:35:01.524Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.6084, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.6724, "market_brier": 0.121522, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"YES\",\"prob\":0.99}" } }, { "id": "wm-0011", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "The NASDAQ crashes before 2026-08-30 (mirrors Manifold 'will-the-nasdaq-crash-before-aug-30'; crash defined by the source market).", "probability": 0.24, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2386, "base_rate_p": 0.2, "reasoning": "The crowd price of 24% already incorporates current market sentiment and recent volatility. Historical base rates suggest a ~20% chance of a crash in any 2‑year period, so the market's modest upward adjustment is reasonable. No strong new evidence pushes the probability far from the crowd estimate. [ensemble: outside 26%, inside 24%, neutral 24%; median 24%, spread 2pts]", "analogs": [ "NASDAQ 2000‑2002 dot‑com bust (20%+ drop within 2 years)", "NASDAQ 2008 financial crisis drop", "2008 financial crisis (major crash within a year)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~24% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-08-29T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T18:58:05.587Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.2-news-ensemble", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "outside", "p": 0.26, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "inside", "p": 0.24, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "neutral", "p": 0.24, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.02 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0011", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-08-31T00:35:01.933Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.0576, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.04, "market_brier": 0.05693, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.013206592416522426}" } }, { "id": "wm-0012", "domain": "geopolitics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "The US and Iran sign a formal end-of-war agreement by 2026-08-31 (mirrors Manifold 'will-the-us-and-iran-sign-a-formal').", "probability": 0.71, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.5832, "base_rate_p": 0.55, "incentive_map": "US: avoid costly prolonged conflict, protect shipping lanes, restore global credibility, domestic political pressure to show success; Iran: lift sanctions, gain economic relief, preserve regime legitimacy, avoid further devastation; Regional powers (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan): manage secu", "reasoning": "The US faces escalating costs and diplomatic isolation, while Iran urgently needs sanction relief; both have strong incentives to convert the 60‑day cease‑fire into a durable settlement. Historical cases (e.g., 1990‑91 Gulf cease‑fire to formal peace, 2003 Iraq cease‑fire to diplomatic accords) show that when a credible interim deal is signed and external mediators (Pakistan) are involved, the transition to a formal treaty is more likely than not. The recent publicized memorandum and media coverage indicate momentum, pushing probability above the crowd baseline. [ensemble: incentives 71%, history 71%, signals 66%; median 71%, spread 5pts]", "analogs": [ "1990 Gulf War cease‑fire leading to the 1991 Gulf Peace Treaty", "2003 Iraq cease‑fire and subsequent US‑Iraq Status of Forces Agreement", "1995‑1996 US‑Iraq cease‑fire leading to the 1998 UN‑sanctions framework" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~58% at binding (2026-06-21). A global, incentive-driven behavioral question — the first non-crypto/non-macro forecast under the v0.3 incentive engine.", "resolution_date": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:38:28.927Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.3-incentive-global", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.71, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.71, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.05 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0019", "domain": "geopolitics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will territory change hands between Georgia (in the Caucasus) and separatists/Russia before Sep 2026 (mirrors Manifold 'will-territory-change-hands-between').", "probability": 0.22, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2798, "base_rate_p": 0.18, "incentive_map": "Georgia: regain internationally recognized borders, domestic political legitimacy, NATO aspirations; limited military capability, heavy reliance on Western aid. Russia: maintain strategic foothold, prevent NATO expansion, project power, domestic narrative of protecting compatriots; can use low‑inten", "reasoning": "Russia gains more by keeping the breakaway regions as frozen conflicts than by risking open war that could trigger NATO response; Georgia lacks the capacity to retake them and gains more from diplomatic pressure. The incentive for a sudden territorial shift is low for both sides, making a change before Sep 2026 unlikely. [ensemble: incentives 22%, history 7%, signals 27%; median 22%, spread 20pts]", "analogs": [ "Russia’s maintenance of Transnistria in Moldova (1990s‑present)", "Turkey’s handling of Northern Cyprus (1974‑present)", "2008 Russo‑Georgian War (quick but limited territorial shift, then stalemate)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~28% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.07, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.2 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0019", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-09-02T00:35:01.375Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.0484, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.0324, "market_brier": 0.078288, "beat_market": true, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.010000000000000023}" } }, { "id": "wm-0051", "domain": "sports", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Carlos Alcaraz win at least 2 Grand Slams in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-carlos-alcaraz-win-at-least-2-UAsREZuPt2').", "probability": 0.42, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2646, "base_rate_p": 0.22, "incentive_map": "Carlos Alcaraz (career legacy, prize money, sponsor bonuses) → wants multiple titles; ATP/Grand Slam organizers (higher viewership, ticket sales) → promote star players; sponsors (brand exposure) → reward performance with bonuses; competitors (protect ranking) → may elevate own play but also risk in", "reasoning": "Alcaraz has already secured the Australian Open, satisfying his immediate financial and legacy incentives, making a second Slam highly rewarding. The marginal cost (physical strain) is offset by sponsor bonuses and ranking points, and past elite players who win one Slam early in the year often capture at least one more (e.g., Federer 2004, Djokovic 2021). However, injury risk and rising competition temper the odds. [ensemble: incentives 42%, history 44%, signals 42%; median 42%, spread 2pts]", "analogs": [ "Roger Federer 2004 season (won Australian and Wimbledon)", "Novak Djokovic 2021 season (won Australian and French Open after early win)", "Novak Djokovic 2021 (won Australian and French)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~26% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-09-13T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.42, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.44, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.42, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.02 }, "status": "resolved_no", "resolution": { "forecast_id": "wm-0051", "resolved_outcome": 0, "resolved_at": "2026-09-13T00:35:01.231Z", "brier_vs_outcome": 0.1764, "brier_vs_base_rate": 0.0484, "market_brier": 0.070013, "beat_market": false, "note": "{\"resolution\":\"NO\",\"prob\":0.0008908128867113875}" } }, { "id": "wm-0014", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "The US government shuts down on October 1, 2026 (mirrors Manifold 'us-government-shutdown-on-october-1').", "probability": 0.35, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.4457, "base_rate_p": 0.28, "incentive_map": "President (avoid political backlash, maintain public services, preserve legacy) + Senate Democrats (prevent GOP concessions, avoid voter anger) + Senate Republicans (extract policy concessions, signal fiscal conservatism) + Federal employees (seek pay continuity) + Public opinion (punishes perceived", "reasoning": "All major actors face higher political costs from a shutdown on the first day of the fiscal year than from a mid‑year lapse, and they can extract limited concessions through brief brinkmanship. Historical patterns show they usually reach a stop‑gap deal before Oct 1, making a shutdown less likely than the market price suggests. [ensemble: incentives 35%, history 27%, signals 42%; median 35%, spread 15pts]", "analogs": [ "FY 2013 shutdown (mid‑year, avoided by late‑October deal)", "FY 2018–19 shutdown (started Dec 22, after initial funding lapses, but avoided on Oct 1 start)", "FY 1995 shutdown (started in Nov, not Oct) – early‑year brinkmanship but resolved before Oct 1" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~45% at binding (2026-06-21). A fiscal-brinkmanship behavioral question.", "resolution_date": "2026-09-30T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:45:47.158Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.3-incentive-global", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.42, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.15 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0020", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "If Trump wins, will marijuana be federally rescheduled before the 2026 midterms? (mirrors Manifold 'if-trump-wins-will-marijuana-be-fed').", "probability": 0.34, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3663, "base_rate_p": 0.22, "incentive_map": "President Trump (seeks electoral boost from pro‑cannabis voters and industry donors, but also wants to appear tough on drugs to satisfy base and law‑enforcement lobby); DEA/Justice Dept (bureaucratic inertia, career incentives to maintain Schedule I status, but also pressure from industry and public", "reasoning": "Trump's incentive to court both the libertarian‑leaning electorate and the law‑and‑order base creates a conflict that usually results in a low‑key approach; the DEA's institutional resistance further lowers the chance of rapid action. Past attempts under similar mixed incentives have stalled, making a pre‑midterm rescheduling unlikely. [ensemble: incentives 27%, history 34%, signals 35%; median 34%, spread 8pts]", "analogs": [ "George W. Bush's 2001 executive order to review marijuana scheduling, which produced no change", "Barack Obama's 2009 directive to reconsider scheduling, also resulting in no rescheduling", "Obama’s 2010 push to reschedule marijuana that stalled due to congressional opposition" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~37% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-11-03T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.34, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.08 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0015", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Republicans maintain control of the US Senate after the 2026 midterms (mirrors Manifold 'will-republicans-maintain-control-o-hphq20hIhn').", "probability": 0.62, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.55, "base_rate_p": 0.62, "incentive_map": "Republican incumbents & party: preserve power, fundraising, committee chair perks; Democratic challengers: flip seats, national party support; Voters: respond to economic conditions, presidential approval, local candidate quality; State parties: redistricting & candidate recruitment incentives; Dono", "reasoning": "Republicans start 2026 with a sizable majority (53‑47) and face a historically favorable map; the president's party (Democrats) typically loses ground in midterms, and Republican incumbents have strong fundraising and institutional incentives to hold seats. Historical midterm patterns and the current modest market price together push the odds above 50%. [ensemble: incentives 62%, history 62%, signals 58%; median 62%, spread 4pts]", "analogs": [ "2022 midterms – GOP retained Senate despite modest losses after a Democratic president", "2018 midterms – Republicans held Senate despite losing House, benefitting from incumbency and favorable map", "2022 Senate elections where the incumbent party (Democrats) retained control despite modest map advantage" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~55% at binding (2026-06-21). An electoral-behavior question.", "resolution_date": "2026-11-06T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:45:47.158Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.3-incentive-global", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.58, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.04 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0047", "domain": "crypto", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Bitcoin exceed $100,000 before December 31, 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-bitcoin-exceed-100000-before-d').", "probability": 0.27, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.24, "base_rate_p": 0.22, "incentive_map": "Bitcoin miners (earn more BTC if price rises, but also face higher electricity costs and potential regulatory pressure); large holders/institutions (seek capital appreciation but also risk of drawdown and regulatory scrutiny); retail speculators (chase upside, driven by FOMO, but also limited capita", "reasoning": "Miners and institutions will support price gains up to the point where higher costs, regulatory clampdowns, or margin calls outweigh upside, leading to a ceiling around current levels. Retail hype is insufficient to push past $100k without a macro shock or major adoption catalyst, which are unlikely given tightening regulation and macro uncertainty. [ensemble: incentives 27%, history 27%, signals 22%; median 27%, spread 5pts]", "analogs": [ "Bitcoin 2017‑2018 cycle where price peaked near $20k then fell below $10k for over a year", "Ethereum 2021‑2022 where price rose to $4.8k then stalled below $3k for many months", "Bitcoin’s rise from $30k to $60k in 2020‑21 under low rates and institutional inflows" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~24% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-30T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.05 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0017", "domain": "geopolitics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Russia x Ukraine ceasefire in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'russia-x-ukraine-ceasefire-in-2026').", "probability": 0.34, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2946, "base_rate_p": 0.2, "incentive_map": "Russia: preserve regime legitimacy, avoid costly attrition, extract concessions, maintain strategic depth; Ukraine: secure territorial integrity, obtain security guarantees, sustain Western support; United States/Western allies: avoid escalation, limit Russian gains, keep NATO credibility, domestic ", "reasoning": "Russia faces mounting economic sanctions and war weariness but gains from a frozen front; Ukraine needs a durable security guarantee that Russia is unlikely to grant. Both sides can extract political capital from a limited truce, yet each also benefits from keeping pressure to improve bargaining power. Historical analogs show such incentives produce short‑term pauses, not lasting ceasefires. [ensemble: incentives 22%, history 35%, signals 34%; median 34%, spread 13pts]", "analogs": [ "2008 Russo‑Georgian war – brief ceasefire without resolution", "2020‑2021 Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict – ceasefire driven by external pressure but fragile", "1995 Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian war after years of stalemate" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~29% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.34, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.13 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0018", "domain": "geopolitics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will X be banned by more than one NATO country in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-x-be-banned-by-more-than-one-n').", "probability": 0.27, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3111, "base_rate_p": 0.12, "incentive_map": "NATO member governments (domestic political pressure to regulate harmful content, desire to appear tough on misinformation, lobbying by local media and consumer groups) vs X's owners (protect revenue, avoid precedent, leverage US diplomatic influence) vs US government (protect a US‑based tech champi", "reasoning": "Domestic political incentives push several NATO countries toward strong action, but the hidden incentive of avoiding a US‑backed tech ban and the economic cost to the platform keep outright bans rare. Past cases show regulators prefer fines and content rules over bans, so a multi‑country ban remains unlikely. [ensemble: incentives 27%, history 17%, signals 27%; median 27%, spread 10pts]", "analogs": [ "EU's fines and content‑removal orders against X and other platforms (2022‑2025)", "Attempts to ban TikTok in the US and EU, resulting in restrictions rather than full bans", "EU‑led bans on Russian social media platforms in 2022‑23" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~31% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.17, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.1 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0021", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will the 2026 US Midterm Elections generally be considered free and fair? (mirrors Manifold '2026-us-midterm-elections-generally').", "probability": 0.74, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.7675, "base_rate_p": 0.88, "incentive_map": "Key actors: (1) Federal election officials & DOJ – incentive to maintain legitimacy of institutions (career, budget, future appointments) but also political pressure to favor party in power; (2) State election administrators – incentive to follow federal guidance for resources but also local partisa", "reasoning": "Federal officials have strong career and institutional incentives to avoid a legitimacy crisis, and the bipartisan consensus among state officials historically leans toward preserving the process. While partisan actors have incentives to claim irregularities, the cost of a widely accepted fraud claim (legal challenges, loss of donor support) is high. Historical analogs show that even under aggressive partisan attacks, the system usually self‑corrects and is still deemed free and fair. [ensemble: incentives 62%, history 74%, signals 85%; median 74%, spread 23pts]", "analogs": [ "1996–2000 elections after the 1995–96 Republican push for voter ID laws", "2020 presidential election amid extensive fraud claims and post‑election litigation", "2000 presidential election – intense partisan challenges to legitimacy but ultimate certification by courts" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~77% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.74, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.85, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.23 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0022", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Intoxicating hemp-derived THC products federally banned in U.S. by end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'intoxicating-hempderived-thc-produc').", "probability": 0.27, "confidence": "low", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.7323, "base_rate_p": 0.3, "incentive_map": "Key actors: U.S. Senate (avoids alienating agricultural lobby and cannabis industry, seeks tax revenue), House (passed farm bill but limited), hemp industry (wants market access, opposes ban), law‑enforcement/DEA (prefers clear prohibition to avoid enforcement ambiguity), public health groups (mixed", "reasoning": "The Senate faces powerful agricultural and cannabis lobbying and a fiscal incentive from a legal market, making a total ban politically costly. Past legislative patterns show compromise via THC caps, not prohibition. With the House already limiting THC levels, the incremental step to a ban offers little added benefit to most stakeholders. [ensemble: incentives 25%, history 27%, signals 62%; median 27%, spread 37pts]", "analogs": [ "1996 Farm Bill’s hemp definition and subsequent 2018 Farm Bill’s THC cap", "2018 federal attempts to reclassify hemp-derived CBD leading to regulation, not ban", "2018 Farm Bill amendment attempts to restrict hemp THC that stalled in Senate" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~73% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.25, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.37 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0024", "domain": "politics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will labour top a national/GB poll for the next UK election by the end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-labour-top-a-nationalgb-poll-f').", "probability": 0.66, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.5507, "base_rate_p": 0.58, "incentive_map": "Key actors: Labour Party (desire to win power, control policy, funding, media narrative); Conservative Party (desire to retain power, avoid loss of patronage, limit policy reversals); Voters (economic security, identity, anti‑incumbency sentiment); Media & pollsters (drive audience, influence narrat", "reasoning": "Labour currently enjoys a sizable lead in poll‑of‑polls and the Conservatives face low approval, economic headwinds, and internal division, creating strong incentives for voters to switch. Historical patterns show opposition parties under such conditions typically overtake incumbents, and donors/media tend to reinforce the leading narrative, further boosting Labour’s visibility. [ensemble: incentives 66%, history 63%, signals 66%; median 66%, spread 3pts]", "analogs": [ "2010 UK election: Labour led in polls after 2008 financial crisis, Conservatives won due to anti‑incumbency but later reversed in 2015.", "2017 UK election: Labour surged in polls amid Conservative scandals, ultimately narrowing the gap but not winning.", "1997 UK election – Labour surged ahead amid Conservative economic woes" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~55% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.63, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.03 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0025", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will the S&P 500 close above 7883.34 on December 31, 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-the-sp-500-close-above-788334').", "probability": 0.58, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.52, "base_rate_p": 0.67, "incentive_map": "Institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, ETFs) want to beat benchmarks and avoid underperformance penalties; hedge funds chase momentum and avoid being caught short; corporate executives care about stock‑based compensation tied to index levels; the Federal Reserve and Treasury benefit f", "reasoning": "The dominant incentives push capital into equities as long as earnings growth and policy support remain positive, creating self‑reinforcing buying pressure. Historical patterns show markets tend to ride bullish forecasts to new highs, unless a sharp shock occurs, which current macro signals do not indicate. [ensemble: incentives 58%, history 58%, signals 65%; median 58%, spread 7pts]", "analogs": [ "S&P 500 end‑2020 rally after strong earnings and accommodative Fed policy", "S&P 500 end‑2017 rise amid fiscal stimulus and low interest rates", "Year‑end S&P 500 outcomes during 2010‑2020 when Fed policy was dovish and corporate earnings were expanding" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~52% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.58, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.58, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.65, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.07 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0026", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "AI bubble pops in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'ai-bubble-pops-in-2026').", "probability": 0.45, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2, "base_rate_p": 0.4, "incentive_map": "VCs & public‑market investors chase outsized returns and fear missing out, so they keep funding AI startups even as valuations become detached; AI firms with heavy debt and burn rates want to raise more capital and may over‑promise, creating pressure to deliver quickly; large tech incumbents and gov", "reasoning": "The incentive to keep the narrative alive pushes capital into AI despite mounting debt and weak fundamentals, but the hidden incentive of debt‑laden firms to avoid default creates a breaking point. When financing dries up, the over‑extension typically triggers a rapid correction, as seen in past dot‑com and crypto bubbles. [ensemble: incentives 57%, history 42%, signals 45%; median 45%, spread 15pts]", "analogs": [ "Late‑1990s dot‑com bubble collapse", "2017‑2022 cryptocurrency boom and bust", "Late‑1990s dot‑com bubble" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~20% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.57, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.42, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.45, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.15 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0027", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will US unemployment get above 6% in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-us-unemployment-get-above-6-in').", "probability": 0.15, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2129, "base_rate_p": 0.18, "incentive_map": "Federal Reserve (maintain price stability, avoid recession), Treasury (manage debt service, political pressure for low unemployment), businesses (hire based on demand, avoid labor costs), workers (seek jobs, accept wages), politicians (claim economic success, avoid blame for high unemployment)", "reasoning": "Current data show unemployment stable at 4.3% with Fed projecting similar levels; absent a major shock, incentives push policymakers to keep rates low and businesses to maintain hiring. Historical analogues suggest a jump above 6% requires a recessionary shock, which is not evident, so the chance remains low but not zero. [ensemble: incentives 15%, history 15%, signals 25%; median 15%, spread 10pts]", "analogs": [ "Early 1980s recession where tight monetary policy spurred unemployment to >7%", "2008 financial crisis where credit crunch pushed unemployment above 6%", "Early 2000s post‑dot‑com boom where Fed kept rates low to sustain sub‑6% unemployment" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~21% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.15, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.15, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.25, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.1 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0028", "domain": "macro", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Us market crash in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'us-market-crash-in-2026').", "probability": 0.35, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.1886, "base_rate_p": 0.2, "incentive_map": "Federal Reserve (avoid recession, maintain credibility, political pressure to keep unemployment low); Large institutional investors (protect assets, avoid losses, but also benefit from buying low); Politicians (short‑term electoral incentives to claim growth, long‑term fiscal pressures); Media/analy", "reasoning": "The Fed’s incentive to pre‑emptively tighten policy to curb inflation creates a hidden risk of over‑tightening, while institutional investors have a perverse incentive to sell into weakness to rebalance, potentially amplifying a downturn. However, political pressure to avoid a recession and the historical tendency of markets to rebound after policy easing lower the odds of a sustained crash. [ensemble: incentives 35%, history 27%, signals 35%; median 35%, spread 8pts]", "analogs": [ "Early 2000s Fed tightening leading to the 2000‑2002 equity decline", "Post‑2008 QE unwind concerns in 2013‑2014", "Early 2000s post‑dot‑com correction amid Fed tightening" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~19% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.08 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0029", "domain": "economics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will the Federal Reserve hike interest rates in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-the-federal-reserve-hike-inter-gcPlnRdpUp').", "probability": 0.35, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.6131, "base_rate_p": 0.4, "incentive_map": "Federal Reserve Board (maintain credibility, avoid inflation, protect employment); Federal Open Market Committee members (career incentives to appear decisive, avoid political backlash); Treasury & markets (prefer rate stability for debt servicing); Politicians (avoid blame for high rates).", "reasoning": "The Fed's primary incentive is price stability; with inflation trending down and the economy showing mixed growth, a hike would risk recession and political criticism. Historical patterns show the Fed pauses after a series of hikes once inflation eases, making a further increase less likely. [ensemble: incentives 35%, history 35%, signals 35%; median 35%, spread 0pts]", "analogs": [ "Post-2018 rate hikes when the Fed held steady in 2019 amid slowing growth", "2022-2023 cycle where the Fed paused after several aggressive hikes as inflation cooled", "2023 Fed hold through June then hike in July amid rising inflation" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~61% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0031", "domain": "economics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Gold above $6k in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'gold-to-6k-by-end-of-2026').", "probability": 0.32, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3541, "base_rate_p": 0.25, "incentive_map": "Central banks (store value, hedge currency risk), institutional investors (portfolio diversification, performance fees), gold mining firms (higher stock price, financing), analysts/banks (forecast credibility, client retention), media (clicks, narrative)", "reasoning": "Central banks and large investors have strong incentives to buy gold when fiat currencies look weak, which pushes price up; banks and analysts may issue bullish forecasts to attract clients, creating self‑fulfilling demand. However, past cycles show that even with supportive incentives, gold often stalls below $6k unless a major shock occurs, so the odds are modestly above base rate but not dominant. [ensemble: incentives 45%, history 32%, signals 22%; median 32%, spread 23pts]", "analogs": [ "Gold rally to $1,900 in 2011 driven by QE, sovereign debt crises, and central bank buying", "Gold rise to $2,000 in 2020 amid pandemic uncertainty and massive fiscal stimulus", "Gold price forecasts for 2020 made in 2015 (most missed the target)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~35% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.45, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.32, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.23 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0032", "domain": "tech", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will any frontier model score LOWER than its predecessor on a major benchmark at launch? (mirrors Manifold 'will-any-frontier-model-score-lower').", "probability": 0.22, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.43, "base_rate_p": 0.15, "incentive_map": "AI labs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, etc.) want headline‑grabbing improvements to attract customers, funding, and talent, so they pressure teams to release models that beat prior versions on key benchmarks. At the same time, engineering timelines, safety gating, and competitive race pressure", "reasoning": "The dominant incentive to showcase progress pushes teams to fine‑tune for benchmark scores, but hidden incentives—tight release schedules, safety cut‑backs, and competitive one‑upmanship—often lead to insufficient testing, making regressions plausible. Historical patterns show regressions occur about 30‑35% of the time, and current race intensity slightly raises that likelihood. [ensemble: incentives 38%, history 15%, signals 22%; median 22%, spread 23pts]", "analogs": [ "Anthropic Claude 2 vs. Claude 1 regression on reasoning benchmarks (2023)", "Google Gemini 1.5 launch with lower MMLU score than Gemini 1 (2024)", "GPT‑4 vs GPT‑3.5 release (no regression on major benchmarks)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~43% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.38, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.15, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.23 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0033", "domain": "tech", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will the US enact AI regulation for all Mythos+ models in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-the-us-enact-ai-regulation-for').", "probability": 0.35, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3044, "base_rate_p": 0.28, "incentive_map": "Executive branch (President & agencies) seeks AI leadership and security, incentivized to appear proactive; tech industry lobbyists and major AI firms fear costly compliance and favor voluntary frameworks; Congress balances voter concerns about safety vs economic growth, with many members receiving ", "reasoning": "The President’s executive order creates a voluntary regime, which satisfies the administration’s security narrative while placating industry. Strong lobbying and upcoming elections dampen appetite for mandatory rules, so the default is limited, opt‑in oversight. Past episodes (e.g., GDPR‑style AI bills) stalled until a crisis forced action, which has not yet materialized. [ensemble: incentives 32%, history 35%, signals 38%; median 35%, spread 6pts]", "analogs": [ "EU’s initial voluntary AI ethics guidelines (pre‑AI Act) and subsequent delay in full regulation", "US approach to cybersecurity after the 2018 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, favoring voluntary frameworks over mandatory mandates", "Congressional action on biotechnology after CRISPR debates (2020‑2022)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~30% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.32, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.38, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.06 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0034", "domain": "tech", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will any AI achieve a score of 25% on ARC-AGI-3 by the end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-any-ai-achieve-a-score-of-25-o').", "probability": 0.32, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3953, "base_rate_p": 0.2, "incentive_map": "AI labs (OpenAI, DeepMind, Anthropic, etc.) → funding, talent attraction, reputation; benchmark organizers → prestige, sponsorship, demonstration of progress; investors → ROI on AI breakthroughs; researchers → paper citations, career advancement; hidden incentive: labs may withhold full capabilities", "reasoning": "Labs have strong economic and reputational incentives to push scores up, and recent rapid scaling suggests a steep learning curve, but the 25% threshold still requires a non‑incremental breakthrough that historically takes longer than the remaining 9‑12 months. Hence a modest probability. [ensemble: incentives 32%, history 27%, signals 34%; median 32%, spread 7pts]", "analogs": [ "ARC-AGI-2 (first jump from <1% to ~12% within 10 months)", "AlphaGo Zero's rapid improvement on Go benchmark (from 0 to >90% in ~6 months after new architecture)", "ARC-AGI-2 first-year performance vs. frontier models" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~40% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.32, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.34, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.07 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0035", "domain": "tech", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will there be self driving taxis in London, UK by the end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-there-be-self-driving-taxis-in-5f5ad7fbb169').", "probability": 0.78, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.7189, "base_rate_p": 0.65, "incentive_map": "Wayve/Waymo & other robotaxi firms: profit from early market entry, regulatory goodwill, data acquisition; UK Transport Secretary & London Mayor: political credit for tech leadership, economic growth, job creation; Public & passenger groups: safety concerns vs convenience; Traditional taxi unions: p", "reasoning": "Firms face strong revenue incentives to be first movers and have already invested heavily in UK trials; regulators have publicly pledged to allow trials and gain political capital, while safety concerns are mitigated by safety‑driver requirements. Historically, once trial approvals are granted, commercial rollout follows quickly, especially when political actors want to showcase innovation. [ensemble: incentives 78%, history 86%, signals 78%; median 78%, spread 8pts]", "analogs": [ "Waymo’s public‑road robotaxi launch in Phoenix (2020) after limited trials", "Uber’s autonomous taxi pilot in Pittsburgh (2021) after safety‑driver phase", "Waymo robotaxi launch in Phoenix (2018) after years of testing" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~72% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.86, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.78, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.08 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0036", "domain": "tech", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will a quantum computer factor a 6-bit number by 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-a-quantum-computer-factor-a-6b').", "probability": 0.78, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3203, "base_rate_p": 0.725, "incentive_map": "Quantum research labs (IBM, Google, academic groups) seek high‑profile breakthroughs to attract funding, talent, and media attention; governments and defense agencies fund quantum projects for strategic advantage and thus reward demonstrable milestones; scientists have personal career incentives to ", "reasoning": "The incentive to claim a visible quantum advantage on any non‑trivial number drives labs to push experiments aggressively; a 6‑bit factorization is technically trivial for current noisy‑intermediate‑scale quantum devices, so the main barrier is demonstration, not fundamental physics. Historical patterns show such low‑bit milestones are achieved once sufficient attention and funding converge. [ensemble: incentives 71%, signals 85%; median 78%, spread 14pts]", "analogs": [ "IBM's 2012 demonstration of factoring 15 (4‑bit) on a superconducting qubit system", "Google/University of Science and Technology of China 2019 factoring of 21 (5‑bit) using a photonic quantum processor", "2012‑2014 demonstrations of Shor's algorithm factoring 15 on IBM/University chips" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~32% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.71, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.85, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.14 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0037", "domain": "economics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Tesla provide (or be included in) an autonomous ride-hailing service before the end of 2026 (mirrors Manifold 'will-tesla-provide-an-autonomous-dr').", "probability": 0.68, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.6285, "base_rate_p": 0.45, "incentive_map": "Elon Musk/TSLA execs: boost stock, justify valuation, secure regulatory goodwill, pre‑empt competition; investors: desire upside, avoid loss; regulators: ensure safety, avoid political fallout; consumers: demand low‑cost mobility, but risk aversion to unproven tech.", "reasoning": "Musk faces intense pressure to deliver a headline‑making product that validates Tesla's AI narrative and sustains its market cap, while regulators and investors reward any operational rollout, even with limited supervision. Past patterns show Tesla overpromising, but recent supervised deployments and mounting competitive pressure increase the payoff of a 2026 launch, making a yes more likely than the baseline. [ensemble: incentives 68%, history 66%, signals 87%; median 68%, spread 21pts]", "analogs": [ "Waymo's limited public robotaxi launch after years of beta testing", "Uber's self‑driving car rollout delays despite early announcements", "Waymo's 2020 promise of driverless taxis in Phoenix (delayed until 2022)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~63% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.68, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.87, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.21 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0038", "domain": "economics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "[ACX 2026] Will OpenAI file for an IPO during 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'acx-2026-will-openai-file-for-an-ip').", "probability": 0.98, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.7458, "base_rate_p": 0.85, "incentive_map": "OpenAI (founders, executives, investors) → maximize valuation, liquidity, and talent retention; board & shareholders → cash out at peak market valuation; employees → stock options vesting and wealth creation; regulators & public → desire transparency but limited barrier to filing; competitors → moni", "reasoning": "OpenAI has already confidentially submitted a draft S‑1, indicating the primary incentive—realizing a massive valuation via public markets—has been acted on. The hidden incentive to lock in founder and early employee wealth before market volatility spikes further pushes filing. Historical patterns show firms in this position file quickly, and there is no regulatory barrier preventing the filing. [ensemble: incentives 98%, history 97%, signals 98%; median 98%, spread 1pts]", "analogs": [ "Meta's 2021 confidential S‑1 filing after reaching $100B revenue", "Snowflake's 2020 S‑1 filing after hitting $1B ARR and a $70B valuation", "Google's 2004 IPO after $3B revenue and $23B valuation" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~75% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.98, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.97, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.98, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.01 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0040", "domain": "science", "track": "mirror", "claim": "[ACX 2026] Will the FDA approve a psilocybin treatment during 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'acx-2026-will-the-fda-approve-a-psi').", "probability": 0.38, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3059, "base_rate_p": 0.25, "incentive_map": "FDA (political pressure to show action on mental health, desire for regulatory success, budget constraints) → seeks approvals that can be fast‑tracked with clear data; Compass Pathways & other psychedelics firms (huge market upside, shareholder value, R&D sunk costs) → push for rapid NDA acceptance;", "reasoning": "The FDA faces strong political incentives to demonstrate progress on mental‑health crises, and the administration has signaled willingness to accelerate psychedelic approvals. Companies have aligned their roll‑out to the FDA’s new 1‑2 month review track, creating a coordinated push. However, lingering safety concerns, the novelty of the class, and potential congressional pushback keep the path uncertain, pulling the probability below 0.5. [ensemble: incentives 38%, history 34%, signals 62%; median 38%, spread 28pts]", "analogs": [ "FDA fast‑track approval of esketamine (2019) for treatment‑resistant depression", "Accelerated approval of CAR‑T therapies (2017‑2020) under strong political and industry pressure", "FDA fast‑track approval of breakthrough therapies for rare diseases (e.g., gene therapies 2017‑2022)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~31% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.38, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.34, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.28 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0041", "domain": "science", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Starship’s upper stage be caught successfully on SpaceX’s first attempt? (mirrors Manifold 'will-starships-upper-stage-be-caugh').", "probability": 0.55, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.4365, "base_rate_p": 0.22, "incentive_map": "SpaceX (Elon Musk) – financial returns, investor confidence, regulatory licensing, brand prestige; NASA/US govt – demonstration of US launch capability, funding justification; contractors and employees – job security, bonuses tied to milestones; public/market – hype and stock impact.", "reasoning": "SpaceX faces intense pressure to prove full reusability, so it will allocate maximum engineering resources and accept higher risk tolerances, raising the chance above the historical baseline. However, the technical difficulty remains extreme and no prior successful catch exists, keeping the odds modest. [ensemble: incentives 34%, history 55%, signals 55%; median 55%, spread 21pts]", "analogs": [ "First successful Falcon 9 first-stage landing after multiple failures", "Early attempts at autonomous drone ship landings for reusable rockets", "SpaceX Falcon 9 first‑stage drone‑ship landings (early attempts ~70% success after iterative learning)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~44% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.34, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.55, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.55, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.21 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0043", "domain": "society", "track": "mirror", "claim": "8. AI a central issue in the 2026 U.S. midterms. Politics get complex, especially regarding job oss [See full title!] (mirrors Manifold '8-ai-a-central-issue-in-the-2026-us').", "probability": 0.62, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.6737, "base_rate_p": 0.55, "incentive_map": "AI companies & PACs → maximize favorable regulation & public goodwill via campaign donations; major parties → capture high‑value donor money and mobilize tech‑savvy voters; voters → react to perceived job displacement and safety risks; media → amplify controversy for clicks.", "reasoning": "AI firms stand to gain from shaping policy and will pour money into candidates, making the issue salient for both parties. Historically, when a fast‑growing industry funds elections, the topic rises to a top‑tier campaign theme, especially when voter anxiety about jobs and safety is high. The combined donor pressure and media amplification push AI to the forefront. [ensemble: incentives 62%, history 35%, signals 62%; median 62%, spread 27pts]", "analogs": [ "Internet regulation debates in the 2004‑2008 U.S. elections", "Biotech/CRISPR funding and policy debates in the 2018 midterms", "2008 election and the rise of internet/social media as a campaign issue" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~67% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.62, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.27 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0044", "domain": "society", "track": "mirror", "claim": "[ACX 2026] Will the EU require mandatory age verification on social media or AI before 2027? (mirrors Manifold 'acx-2026-will-the-eu-require-mandat').", "probability": 0.66, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.1846, "base_rate_p": 0.55, "incentive_map": "EU Commission & Parliament: political credit for child protection, avoid regulator backlash, and pre‑empt national bans; tech platforms (Meta, TikTok, etc.): avoid fines, preserve market access, shift compliance cost to third‑party providers; privacy NGOs & digital rights groups: push back on survei", "reasoning": "The Commission has already built an EU‑wide verification app and framed it as a pan‑EU solution, giving it political credit and shielding member states from unilateral bans. Platforms face steep fines under the DSA, so they prefer a single compliant system over fragmented national rules. Historical EU roll‑outs of mandatory tech standards under consumer‑protection pressure show a high adoption rate. [ensemble: incentives 66%, history 35%, signals 68%; median 66%, spread 33pts]", "analogs": [ "GDPR’s mandatory data‑subject access rights and the EU’s rapid enforcement rollout (2018‑2020)", "EU’s Digital Services Act requiring large platforms to implement notice‑and‑action mechanisms (2021‑2022)", "EU's 2018 GDPR enforcement on data consent mechanisms" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~18% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.35, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.68, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.33 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0045", "domain": "society", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will at least 5 democratic countries other than Australia ban social media for kids under 16 by the end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-at-least-5-democratic-countrie').", "probability": 0.27, "confidence": "low", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.3987, "base_rate_p": 0.15, "incentive_map": "National governments (democratic) – incentive to appear protective of children, respond to parental pressure, and gain political capital, but also incentive to avoid antagonizing powerful tech lobbyists and not hurt digital economy; tech platforms – incentive to resist bans, lobby, offer self‑regula", "reasoning": "Governments gain short‑term political points by banning platforms for kids, but face strong industry lobbying and fiscal concerns about tech sector growth, which historically dampens rapid diffusion of bans. The recent wave sparked by Australia creates a policy diffusion incentive, yet the perverse incentive of tech lobbyists and the modest electoral payoff keep adoption limited. [ensemble: incentives 27%, history 22%, signals 66%; median 27%, spread 44pts]", "analogs": [ "Australia's 2025 ban on under‑16 social media use", "EU's age‑verification mandates for online services (2023‑2024) without full bans", "France's 2024 restriction on algorithmic targeting of minors" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~40% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.22, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.44 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0046", "domain": "crypto", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Bitcoin below $55K in 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'bitcoin-below-55k-in-2026').", "probability": 0.63, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.5422, "base_rate_p": 0.58, "incentive_map": "Miners (seek high BTC price to cover electricity costs and profit), institutional investors (risk‑off bias, macro‑inflation concerns, desire to preserve capital), retail speculators (follow momentum and fear of missing out), developers/crypto firms (need price stability for funding and ecosystem gro", "reasoning": "Miners need price > $55K to stay profitable after the 2024 halving, so they lobby for bullish sentiment, but macro risk and institutional risk‑off pressure are strong enough to outweigh that, historically leading to a post‑halving dip. The current market sentiment surveys show a majority expecting sub‑$55K, indicating collective bearish pressure will likely push price down. [ensemble: incentives 55%, history 63%, signals 66%; median 63%, spread 11pts]", "analogs": [ "Post‑2016 halving price trajectory (Bitcoin fell below $10K in 2018)", "Late‑2021 to 2023 crypto bear market where institutional risk‑off drove BTC below prior peaks", "Post‑2020 halving cycle where BTC fell from $64K to $30K within 18 months" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~54% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.55, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.63, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.11 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0030", "domain": "economics", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will the price of oil reach $150 before the end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-the-price-of-oil-reach-150-bef').", "probability": 0.195, "confidence": "med", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.2246, "base_rate_p": 0.16, "incentive_map": "Oil producers (OPEC+, Saudi Arabia, Russia) aim to maximize revenue but avoid demand collapse; major consumers (US, China, EU) seek affordable energy and political stability; financial speculators chase high returns; governments balance fiscal budgets (oil‑dependent) vs inflation pressures; hidden i", "reasoning": "Producers will raise output when prices approach $150 to protect market share, while consumers and governments push for demand‑side mitigation (strategic reserves, subsidies). Speculative pressure can lift prices temporarily, but the net incentive to avoid a demand shock keeps prices below $150 on average. Historical analogs show spikes to $150 are rare and short‑lived. [ensemble: incentives 27%, history 12%; median 20%, spread 15pts]", "analogs": [ "1979‑1980 oil shock (price spikes then rapid OPEC output increase)", "2008 oil price surge to $147 followed by swift demand‑side response and output hike", "1999‑2000 oil price spike after Iraq sanctions and strong demand" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~22% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2027-01-01T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.27, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.12, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.15 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null }, { "id": "wm-0048", "domain": "crypto", "track": "mirror", "claim": "Will Binance be the largest crypto exchange market at the end of 2026? (mirrors Manifold 'will-binance-be-the-largest-crypto-2701253c7680').", "probability": 0.73, "confidence": "high", "market_consensus_at_forecast": 0.4183, "base_rate_p": 0.68, "incentive_map": "Binance (maintain market share, revenue, network effects, avoid regulatory crackdowns); Competing exchanges (gain share, attract users, but face higher compliance costs, limited liquidity); Regulators (enforce rules that may curb Binance's growth, but also push for industry standards that benefit la", "reasoning": "Binance's network effects, deep liquidity, and aggressive product rollout create strong incentives to stay ahead, while rivals lack comparable scale and face higher marginal costs to challenge it. Historical patterns show dominant exchanges rarely lose leadership absent a severe external shock, and no such shock appears imminent. [ensemble: incentives 66%, history 74%, signals 73%; median 73%, spread 8pts]", "analogs": [ "Binance's retention of market dominance after the 2021 regulatory crackdown on KuCoin and Huobi", "Coinbase's sustained US market lead despite competition from Kraken and Gemini", "Binance vs. Coinbase 2018‑2022 (Binance retained lead)" ], "resolution_criteria": "YES if the bound Manifold market resolves YES. Crowd ~42% at binding (2026-06-21).", "resolution_date": "2027-01-01T00:00:00Z", "created_at": "2026-06-20T19:59:24.782Z", "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free", "engine_version": "0.4-incentive-blind", "ensemble": { "passes": [ { "lens": "incentives", "p": 0.66, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "history", "p": 0.74, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" }, { "lens": "signals", "p": 0.73, "model": "openai/gpt-oss-120b:free" } ], "spread": 0.08 }, "status": "open", "resolution": null } ] }